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Nuclear weapons, long considered the bête noire of human existence are examined in this article to 
ascertain if the heinous effects they threaten ultimately serve to promote deterrence between pairs of 
states. The findings suggest that nuclear weapons did have a significant impact on conflict when 
present on both sides of dyadic disputes during the Cold War. In such symmetrical nuclear pairs 
conflict levels are quantitatively shown to be reduced, suggesting that the conflict inhibiting qualities of 
these weapons long espoused by nuclear optimists are legitimate.  
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“The reputation of power is power.” 
-- Thomas Hobbes 
 
Nuclear weapons promote interstate peace. The statement seems counter-intuitive 
initially, as the reader grapples with the seemingly divergent concepts of nuclear weaponry 
and peace. Yet since their creation in 1945 nuclear weapons have not been the bane of 
human existence many feared they would become. Indeed such weapons have not been used 
in conflict since the end of World War II and a number of scholars have theorized that the 
destructive potential displayed by these weapons has ensured peace between the great 
powers ever since (Gallois 1961; Sandoval 1976; Waltz 1981; Bueno de Mesquita and Riker 
1982; Mearsheimer 1990; Weltman 1995). Others are not as sanguine, suggesting that the 
spread of nuclear weapons is something to be actively and vigorously curtailed (Morgenstern 
1959; Ikle 1960; Doty 1960; Nye 1981; Bailey 1991; Spector 1990, 1995; Kraig 1999). Still 
others have called for the complete abolition of nuclear weapons (Gilpin 1962; Schell 1982, 
1984; Ellsberg 1992). This article tests the claims of the first group of scholars, sometimes 
referred to as nuclear optimists, to ascertain if the presence of nuclear weapons led to any 
reduction in conflict between pairs of states during the years of the Cold War. 
The basic notion put forward by the nuclear optimists that overwhelming military 
strength pacifies enemies is not a new concept. The ancient military strategist Sun Tzu 
(1963: 67) argued for the necessity of evasion when one’s opponent had overwhelming force 
saying that when this was the case: “avoid him.” Indeed nuclear pairs of states clearly appear 
to have avoided one another in terms of armed conflict, as there has never been a case of 
interstate warfare between two nuclear powers. But why? This article’s central question is 
simple but critical to our understanding: Does the presence of nuclear weapons retard 
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1. NUCLEAR OPTIMISM  
 
The possible pacifying effect of nuclear weapons 1  on interstate relations has been 
heralded most strongly by neorealist Kenneth Waltz. Waltz put forward the view that the 
spread of nuclear weapons is not necessarily a threat to world security. Waltz (1981), among 
others (Gallois 1961; Sandoval 1976; Bueno de Mesquita and Riker 1982; Mearsheimer 
1990; Weltman 1995), argues that “the measured spread of nuclear weapons is more to be 
welcomed than feared.” Waltz theorizes that the gradual spread of nuclear weapons will 
promote peace and reinforce international stability because nuclear weapons induce caution 
between nuclear adversaries. This leads to the seemingly extreme conclusion that, in fact, 
“more may be better.” 
Though Waltz may be the loudest voice of nuclear proliferation optimism, support for the 
potential pacifying effect the spread of nuclear weapons might induce has existed almost as 
long as the weapons have. Jacob Viner (1946) was the first to openly argue for the potential 
peace nuclear weapons might bring. Viner (1946) theorized that the spread of nuclear 
weaponry throughout the world would make conflict less likely between states because of the 
high price of military victory. Arthur Less Burns (1957) elaborated on Viner ’s theory, 
arguing that in the absence of a sudden technological breakthrough, the spread of nuclear 
weapons could stabilize international relations. Morton Kaplan (1957, 52) concurred with 
Viner and Burns, stating that as long as a “surprise knockout blow was technically 
impossible” nuclear weapons dispersed among a large number of states would ensure a more 
peaceful world. 
The 1960s brought additional advocacy for proliferation optimism. F.H. Hinsley (1963: 
354-55) wrote that nuclear weapons “constitute for the first time a true deterrent, one that 
will never be relied upon so long as it exists – and this is likely to be forever.” French 
General Peter Gallois (Dulles and Crane 1964: 215) added his support, arguing that “If every 
nuclear power held weapons truly invulnerable to the blows of the other, the resort to force 
by the one to the detriment of the other would be impossible.” At the same time, Richard 
Rosecrance (1963) suggested that worries about the strategic consequences of nuclear 
proliferation were exaggerated. Rosecrance (1963: 188) argued: “The nth country ‘problem 
may not turn out to be a problem.” James Rosenau (1969, 103) added six years later: “If the 
threat of minor war makes the two greatest states redouble their efforts in tandem to prevent 
major war, it is even conceivable that nuclear dispersion could have a net beneficial impact.” 
The 1970s brought Robert Sandoval’s (1976) porcupine theory of nuclear proliferation. 
According to this theory, states even with modest nuclear capabilities would “walk like a 
porcupine through the forests of international affairs: no threat to [their] neighbors, too 
prickly for predators to swallow” (Sandoval 1976: 19). It was only after all of this that 
Kenneth Waltz (1981) added his theories to those of the nuclear optimists, suggesting that 
the mere presence of nuclear weapons leads to extreme caution, thereby decreasing the 
likelihood of conflict as more states acquire them. 
Following Waltz, additional scholars have weighed in as nuclear proliferation optimists. 
                                                          
1 A nuclear weapon is an apparatus whose explosive energy is a derivative of fission, fusion, or a 
combination the two nuclear processes. Nuclear fission is the splitting of the nucleus of an atom into 
two or more parts. Nuclear fusion joins light isotopes of hydrogen, usually deuterium and tritium, 
which liberates energy and neutrons (Cochran et al., 1984). 




Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and William Riker (1982) contend that nuclear proliferation serves 
the interests of peace. Martin van Creveld (1993) asserts that “nuclear weapons prevent the 
regional states that have them from fighting each another.” John Weltman (1995: 219) 
theorizes that “the spread of nuclear weapons ... to new powers will tend over time to induce 
caution and moderate conflict.” In fact, nuclear proliferation optimists mostly agree that the 
presence of nuclear weapons generates caution in military and political decision-makers 
irrespective of the geographic location, system of governance, or the political culture of the 
countries in question (Freedman 1988).  
Indeed all weapons, as Robert Jervis (1989) has argued, change the status of states in 
ways that make them more or less secure. For example, as Waltz (1995) notes, “If weapons 
are not well suited for conquest, neighbors have more peace of mind.” Likewise, nuclear 
weapons arguably produce their own effects by providing a strong deterrent against 
aggression (Hinsley 1963; Lavoy 1995; Weltman 1995). Nuclear weapons’ deterrent value 
rests on their ability to punish (Gray 1979, 1990; Waltz 1990). Nuclear weapons provide a 
state with the ability to damage or destroy things the aggressor holds dear to such an extent 
that gains the aggressor had hoped to achieve are outweighed (Waltz 1990; Gray 1998). It is 
believed that this strong punitive aspect of nuclear weapons is what makes them such a 
powerful deterrent against state aggression (Sandoval 1976; Gray 1979, 1990, 1998; Waltz 
1990; Van Creveld 1993; Lavoy 1995). 
 
 
2. PAX ATOMICA 
 
During the Cold War, the overwhelming destructive capabilities of the nuclear weapons 
arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union provided each of these two superpowers 
with a strong deterrent against military conflict between themselves. A like peace would not 
have existed in an international system void of such weapons according to a number of 
scholars (Gaddis 1990; Mearsheimer 1990; Waltz 1990; Lavoy 1995; Weltman 1995; Gray 
1998; Payne 1998a, 1998b). The uncertainties of a world made up merely of states with 
access to conventional weapons are increased because conventional warfare, unlike a nuclear 
conflagration, can be perceived as winnable. For this reason, the likelihood of warfare 
between states increases “because the uncertainties of their outcomes (wars) make it easier 
for the leaders of states to entertain illusions of victory at supportable cost” (Waltz 1990: 58). 
The US-Soviet relationship is particularly important because it represents the longest 
symmetrical nuclear relationship in the history of the world. It is additionally unique because, 
despite the roughly equal military standing between the two states during the Cold War 
period, the United States and the Soviet Union never directly engaged in warfare. The lack of 
interstate warfare during the Cold War has been attributed to the presence of nuclear 
weapons (Jervis 1989; Gaddis 1990; Mearsheimer 1990; Waltz 1990, 1993; Glaser 1998; 
Harkavy 1998; Payne 1998a, 1998b). Indeed the nuclear era seems to be peerless in modern 
history because of this absence of great power conflict. Stephen Cambone and Patrick 
Garrity (1994-95: 77) note: “The past five decades have marked a unique period in human 
history (at least since the establishment of the modern state system in 1648), in which war 
between the dominant powers has not occurred and in which one of those powers actually 
conceded and dissolved itself peacefully.” 
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3. CRISES AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
 
The general effect of nuclear weapons on crises has been to widen the gap between the 
value of the interests in conflict and the potential costs of the war. The separation between 
potential costs and potential outcomes was not as wide, or at least not as clear to prospective 
combatants, in the years prior to the nuclear age. The destructive power nuclear weapons 
pose is clear. Overall, the perceived impact of nuclear weapons on crisis situations basically 
has been twofold: first, it is generally assumed that nuclear weapons lead states to behave in 
a more prudent and constrained fashion, and second it has been argued that nuclear weaponry 
provides a tacit raising of the “provocation threshold”, thereby lengthening the crisis 
escalation “ladder” adversaries must climb before arriving at interstate warfare (Kahn 1960). 
 
 
4. GAMES OF CHICKEN 
 
The way that actors perceive the costs and benefits of a crisis will have an impact on their 
behavior during the crisis. The structure of the situation will affect the incentives to persist in, 
or seek a way out of, the confrontation. If the situation is perceived as being extremely 
dangerous, as is the case in games of Chicken, the actors involved are likely to exercise more 
caution than they might if the crisis is seen as relatively cost-free. It is also possible that a 
perception of danger will increase the search for mutual accommodation. 
With this in mind it is now useful to examine the two types of dyadic crisis interaction 
known as Chicken and Prisoner’s Dilemma. The main difference between the two is that in 
Prisoner’s Dilemma mutual non-cooperation brings about the second worst outcome as seen 
by decision makers, while in Chicken mutual non-cooperation brings about the worst 
outcome. The differing outcomes of Prisoner’s Dilemma and Chicken are displayed in Figure 
One. In Prisoner’s Dilemma, the only way a side loses completely is if it cooperates and its 
adversary does not (producing a 5,0 or 0,5 outcome). This makes cooperation a tenuous goal. 
In games of Chicken, however, cooperation is promoted because persistent non-cooperation 
will bring about a loss for both sides (0,0). Because nothing is gained by persistent non-
cooperation, one or both sides often choose to swerve thereby ending the conflict completely. 
Conflicts between nuclear states are considered to be games of Chicken as non-cooperation 
would bring about the potential destruction of both competitors. 
 
Prisoner’s Dilemma 
 Cooperate Defect 
Cooperate 3,3 0,5 
Defect 5,0 1,1 
 
Chicken 
 Swerve Straight 
Swerve 3,3 1,5 
Straight 5,1 0,0 
  
Figure 1. Prisoner’s Dilemma and Chicken 
 




In their review of international conflicts, Snyder and Diesing (1977) note that conflicts, 
when portrayed as games, can be characterized as being either symmetric or non-symmetric. 
Their finding of interest is that there was a sharp difference in behavior between parties in 
Prisoner’s Dilemmas and parties in Chicken (and asymmetric games). Parties in Chicken and 
asymmetric games do not prefer the outcomes that come with mutual firmness, and thus the 
party that can show it will continue to stand firm will usually prevail. In Prisoner’s Dilemma 
situations, each party prefers war (or the non-cooperative outcome) to accepting the other’s 
demand. This outcome is intuitively believable, for as Snyder and Diesing (1977) suggest: 
 
When this is realized [that both parties prefer war to concession in Prisoner’s Dilemma], the 
parties know they must reduce their goals to something the other can accept, or the outcome is 
likely to be war. There occurs an internal reassessment of goals, plus probing the opponent, to 
determine what is essential and what can be sacrificed, and what the opponent is willing to give 
up. The communication of reduced goals to the opponent is the turning point, after which the 
parties make reciprocal concessions leading to compromise. In the Chicken cases ..., one or 
both parties prefer to yield than risk war. Therefore when one party establishes superiority of 
resolve it can force the other to give way completely, and usually does so. 
 
Thus situations that are seen by the actors as Prisoner’s Dilemmas are more likely to endure 
because there is less risk that they will bring about the worst outcome. While a situation seen 
as Chicken will bring about great pressure to either (1) convince the other party that the non-
cooperative mode will continue or (2) work to bring about the cooperative outcome. As an 
example, the Cuban Missile Crisis can be seen as a game of Chicken, with Kennedy’s non-
cooperative move being continued preparations for an invasion while Khrushchev’s non-
cooperative move was continued installation and preparation of the missiles (Bundy 1988). If 
both persisted in their actions, war was likely, and as a result there were efforts to find a way 
out of the confrontation (Blight 1990).  
Interstate nuclear dyads produce these games of Chicken. The presence of nuclear 
weapons serve to incorporate the element of deterrence and thereby aid in preventing conflict 
escalation. Thus, the conflict process between nuclear states is different from non-nuclear 
dyads as the participants in a nuclear dyad may be deterred not only from nuclear war, but 
also from escalation in general. Thomas Schelling (1966: 35) notes that common conceptions 
of deterrence “seem to depend on the clean-cut notion that war results – or is expected to 
result – only from deliberate yes-no decisions. But if war tends to result from a process, a 
dynamic process in which both sides get more and more deeply involved, more and more 
expectant, more and more concerned not to be a slow second in case war starts, it is not a 
‘credible first strike’ that one threatens, but just plain war.” In other words, states need not 
threaten an immediate full-scale nuclear attack on the other side in order to deter it. Instead, 
they can threaten to take actions that could lead to an undesired conflagration by a series of 
steps that cannot be entirely be foreseen. Empirical evidence bears out this argument: 
Alexander George and Richard Smoke (1974) found that one important cause of deterrence 
failure was the challenger’s belief that he could control risks. In games of Chicken, this is not 
the case. Therefore, the logic of nuclear dyads indicates that they should be less prone to 
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5. CONFLICT ESCALATION AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
 
While it is clear that the deterrent value of nuclear weapons on crises in general is 
impressive among all the nuclear powers (warfare has not occurred between two nuclear 
powers since the creation of such weapons of mass destruction), it is less evident what 
specific impact nuclear weapons may have had on conflict escalation. Might the impact of 
nuclear weapons be felt also in terms of their coercive capabilities? In other words, is it 
reasonable to conceptualize nuclear arms not only as deterrent weapons, but as defensive 
weapons as well? The answer might be yes if one differentiates use from utilization. While 
the actual use of nuclear weapons would be strictly for punitive effect, the utilization of the 
threat of use of nuclear weapons could be used as a defensive measure to repel or stop an 
enemy from taking further action. 
Nuclear weaponry’s strong punitive nature provides an easy understanding as to why 
nuclear devices are often classified under the deterrent heading. Deterrence’s goal, after all, 
is to dissuade an enemy from initiating an action by threatening a highly credible punitive 
response (Morgan 1977). In other words, deterrence in most instances threatens punishment. 
However, US nuclear doctrine in the 1970s and 1980s expanded the definition of deterrence 
by arguing that US nuclear doctrine should be expanded to include deterrence by denial as 
well as deterrence by punishment.2 The aim of deterrence by denial is to hold at risk strategic 
assets (counterforce targets), especially those assets “whose destruction would deny [the 
enemy] military success” (Payne 1998a).  
Defense, on the other hand, is focused upon protection once an action has begun. A 
state’s defensive capability is its ability to limit the costs an adversary can impose on it 
(Snyder 1961; Powell 1990). Defense seeks to stop or reverse an action, goals nuclear 
weapons have not typically been associated with. 
But while nuclear weapons are best described as deterrent weapons (Waltz 1990), when 
conflict does arise between two states nuclear weapons might have some defensive value in 
terms of their coercive potential (Feldman 1995). To be clear, the actual “use” of nuclear 
weapons would not be considered a defensive move, but rather a state’s efforts to “utilize” 
nuclear weapons as a bargaining method during a conflict could be considered a defensive 
gesture. This latter employment could be defined as an example of coercive diplomacy, 
which is limited to defensive actions (George 1991).  
Alexander George (1991: 5) clearly restricts coercive diplomacy to defensive use as he 
describes it as “efforts (made) to persuade an opponent to stop and/or undo an action he is 
already embarked upon.”    
While the threat of the use of nuclear weapons for coercive diplomacy has rarely 
occurred in overt instances (George 1994) describes the Potsdam Declaration as one such 
instance), it seems reasonable to assert that nuclear weapons might have influenced state 
behavior in more subtle ways. The ominous threat such weapons provide might elicit more 
pacific reactions, or at least a more cautionary approach, between adversaries during a 
conflict as each seeks to prevent an escalation toward Armageddon. 
Thus, it is important to examine what impact the presence, or lack thereof, of nuclear 
                                                          
2 The classic description of the distinction between deterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment 
is presented by Glen Snyder (1961). See also Slocombe (1981), (Gray 1984) Sloss and Milot (1984), 
and Payne (1996). 




weapons might have in conflict situations in order to identify if the characteristics of such 
weapons not only may have served to prevent interstate warfare, but also to have dulled 
conflict in general among pairs of states. This study is notable in that the impact nuclear 
weapons have had on conflict escalation between interstate dyads (if they have had any) has 
not yet been explored quantitatively at all, and qualitatively outside of the US-Soviet dyad. 
This probably is the case for two major reasons: first, the relative dearth of nuclear weapons 
states since the first use of the weapons in 1945; and second, their non-use following the end 
of World War II. During the years of the Cold War (1945-1992) only nine states were 
identified as having nuclear weaponry (Spector 1990): the United States (1945); the USSR 
(1949); the UK (1953); France (1960); China (1964); Israel (1970); India (1974); the 
Republic of South Africa (1980); and Pakistan (1986). Such a limited number of states has 
not provided scholars much data with which to work.   
This study argues that the relative scarcity of data on dyadic relations between nuclear 
weapons states can be overcome by simply altering the dependent variable from the mere 
presence of interstate warfare between states to a scaled interstate dispute score which serves 
to measure and compare the level of conflict between states involved in dyadic 
confrontations. Thus, the impact of nuclear weapons can be directly measured to understand 
if such weapons truly have had a pacifying effect on interstate conflict. 
It is hypothesized that the symmetrical presence of nuclear weapons in dyads will lessen 
conflict escalation. The methodology and the means by which this chapter will scientifically 





The most solidly proven contribution of scholars’ of international politics to the social 
science world at-large has been the notion first asserted by Immanuel Kant (1970) that 
democracies do not fight one another. This so-called “democratic peace” phenomenon has 
time and again survived the strict rigors of quantitative analysis to ascend in the realm of 
international politics as the discipline’s most identifiable law.  
The democratic peace proposition, however, augurs caution when presenting its findings 
regarding democracies, by noting that while democracies refrain from warfare in dyadic 
relations with one another, when faced with a state of a differing type (i.e. autocracy, 
anocracy, etc.) democracies are just as likely as other types of states to engage in conflictual 
behavior. Thus, democratic states are pacific only in their dealings with like states. In fact, 
four of the five most conflictual states during the 170 years between 1912-1982 were 
democracies (Chan 1984). Only Russia/USSR was a non-democracy among France, India, 
Israel, and the United Kingdom. 
Might the same be the case with respect to nuclear weapons’ states? In order to ascertain 
if there is a significant difference in conflict escalation among differing types of states three 
categories of dyads have been created: symmetrical nuclear dyads (two nuclear states), 
asymmetrical nuclear dyads (only one nuclear state), and symmetrical non-nuclear dyads 
(two non-nuclear states).    
The conflict observations will be taken from the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) 
data set (Gochman and Maoz 1984; Jones, Bremer and Singer 1997). Those disagreements 
between states considered to be interstate disputes must contain at least one of the following 
three events: “(1) an explicit threat to resort to military force; (2) a mobilization, deployment, 
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or other display of military force; or (3) an actual resort to military force” (Senese 1997, 4). 
For these events to be included, they “must be explicit, overt, non-accidental, and 
government sanctioned” (Gochman and Maoz 1984: 586). 
The MID data set includes interstate dispute data through 1992 (Jones, Bremer and 
Singer 1997). The year 1950 has been chosen as the beginning point for data analysis in this 
paper because this was the first full year in which more than one state in the international 
system had nuclear weapons. Both the United States and the Soviet Union had the atomic 
bomb in 1950, firmly rooting the two superpowers as Cold War adversaries. Within this time 
period of 1950-1992, 1,042 conflict dyads are available for study.     
 
 
7. DEPENDENT VARIABLE: CONFLICT ESCALATION 
 
Escalation processes have been analyzed previously in concert with deterrence (Bueno de 
Mesquita and Riker 1982; Zagare 1992), arms races (Richardson 1960) and the bargaining 
process (Schelling 1960, 1966; Kahn 1965; Young 1968; Smoke 1977). Schelling (1960, 
1966) suggests that one of the effects of escalation is to persuade an opponent to back down 
by playing on the fear that continued and/or future escalation will lead to disastrous results. 
Thus, escalation is often conceptualized as a game of competitive risk taking, with actors 
attempting to demonstrate their superior ability to tolerate risk (Schelling 1960, 1966; Kahn 
1965, Maoz 1985, 1990; Geller 1990). 
Disputes between states are rarely, if ever, static occurrences (Ray 1974). Such 
confrontations often evolve from one stage of conflict to another involving an augmentation 
in hostilities as the initial spark of the confrontation creates a larger conflagration. Thus, this 
paper employs two measures for its dependent variables. First it uses the highest level of 
conflict reached between pairs of states as a dependent variable. This score (see Table 1), 
referred to as the level of hostility, is a scaled reference point allowing the quantitative 
differentiation between levels of conflict. MID dispute level types range from 1 (a 
nonmilitary act) to 22 (interstate warfare).  
 
  
Table 1. MID Dispute Level Codes 
 
1 = Nonmilitary act  4 = Threat to occupy  territory 
2 = Threat to use force  5 = Threat to declare war 
3 = Threat to blockade  6 = Threat to use nukes 
7 = Show of troops  11 = Nuclear Alert 
8 = Show of ships  12 = Mobilization 
9 = Show of planes  13 = Fortify border 
10 = Alert   14 = Border Violation 
15 = Blockade   18 = Clash 
16 = Occupation of territory 19 = Raid 
17 = Seizure 
20 = Declaration of war   
21 = Use of CB weapons 
22 = Interstate warfare 
 




The level of hostility in a dispute is an important marker for distinguishing it from other 
disputes. For example, it seems reasonable to assert that a threat to blockade an area is less 
hostile than an actual naval blockade, just as a mere threat to use force is less hostile than an 
actual raid into another state’s sovereign territory. Thus, the higher a dispute escalates, the 
more dire its consequences can be. 
As a second marker, dispute severity also was used as a dependent variable for conflict 
escalation. The severity of interstate disputes was measured by the number of battle fatalities 
registered by both states. An increase in the number of fatalities is considered to display 
conflict escalation because “an increase in severity is usually associated with an increase in 
the intensity of actions taken by combatants, in terms of militarized uses of force” (Senese 
1997: 7). In other words, higher battle fatalities are considered to be characteristic of a more 
serious conflict. The MID data set employs seven levels of fatalities in its coding procedures: 
0, 1 to 25, 26 to 100, 101 to 250, 251 to 500, 501 to 999, and >999 battle deaths.3 
 
 
8. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 
Eight independent variables are examined in this chapter. The first two of these directly 
relate to the focus of the paper: presence of nuclear weapons. It is hypothesized that those 
dyads in which both of the paired states have nuclear weapons will produce less conflictual 
outcomes than those dyads in which only one nuclear power is present, or in which none is 
present. This is because in symmetrical nuclear dyads there is greater destructive potential 
than in the other two types of dyads. Further, asymmetrical nuclear dyads are hypothesized 
to be less conflictual than non-nuclear dyads again because of the deterrent value of such 
weapons.  
Two dummy variables have been created to measure the effect of nuclear weapons on 
conflict escalations. First, a symmetrical dyad variable has been created. In this variable 
dyads in which two nuclear states are present are coded as “1” and all other cases as “0.” 
Second, an asymmetrical dyad variable has been created. For this dummy variable those 
dyads in which only one nuclear state is present are coded as “1” with all others coded as 
“0.” A dummy variable need not be created for the independent category of non-nuclear 
dyads because its value is determined by the first k - 1 dummies entered into the regression 
equation. In other words, the independent category (also known as the reference category) is 
equal to the Y intercept. 
The data set provides 1,042 conflict dyads between the years of 1950-1992. 56 of these 
conflicts involve a symmetrical pairing of nuclear powers. 291 dyads are asymmetrical in 
nature. These dyads include one nuclear power and one non-nuclear state. The remaining 695 
cases are dyads in which no state with nuclear weapons was present. 
The third predictor variable to be used in this study is democracy. Numerous studies have 
been undertaken to explore the effect of democratic institutions on conflict resolution among 
states (Chan 1984; Maoz and Abdolali 1989; Bremer 1992, 1993a, 1993b; Dixon 1993; 
Russett 1990, 1993, 1995; Senese 1997). Strong agreement among scholars has arisen that 
democratic dyads produce more peaceful outcomes than other dyadic groupings. The coding 
of states as being democratic or not is based on scores taken from the Jaggers and Gurr’s 
(1995) Polity III data set which has been employed in recent studies on the effects of 
                                                          
3 MID does not provide the actual fatality numbers for disputes. 
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democracy on conflict (Reiter and Stam 1998; Ward and Gleditsch 1998). Polity III rates 
individual states’ level of democracy on an 11-point (0-10) scale (Jagger and Gurr 1995). 
This is a continuous interval measure ranging from a score of “0” least democratic to a score 
of “10” or most democratic.  
Fourth, a variable has been created to measure the impact of dyadic maturity on conflict 
escalation. This variable will attempt to capture the impact of stability on interstate relations. 
The assumption here is that more mature polities will recognize the potential costs of 
escalation as well as the ability to call on past experience to reduce the likelihood of conflict 
severity. Scholars have noted a tendency for states in transition, specifically, states whose 
regimes are in flux, to be more likely to engage in military ventures than those whose 
governments remain stable (Mansfield and Snyder, 1995).4 The logic of this argument states 
that those countries which are in a state of flux are more prone to military action because 
their leaders are seeking to rally their publics around a patriotic cause in order to save their 
faltering position. This rally around the flag effect (Miller 1995; Levy and Vakili 1992) is 
intended to provide the leader with the necessary internal support to stay in power. 
Therefore, a variable of dyadic maturity (or stability) has been created by measuring 
polity persistence in years. This variable will be dichotomized, as has been common practice 
in previous studies (Bremer 1992; Senese 1997), as mature/not mature based on a twenty 
year threshold. Again the data will be drawn from the Polity III data-set which extends from 
1800-1994. If both the regimes in a dyad have persisted for at least twenty years the dyad 
will be considered mature; otherwise the dyad will be considered not mature. 
As a fifth independent variable, proximity will be studied. The impact of geographical 
proximity has been shown in previous studies to be significant on the escalation of hostilities 
between states not only because of the animosity close interactions can produce, but also 
because of the monetary expense of such efforts (Bremer 1992; Diehl 1985; Russett 1993; 
Vasquez 1993, 1995; Senese 1996). War fighting is a costly business after all, and therefore 
the monetary impact of moving troops and equipment often serves as a strong deterrent. 
Proximity serves to lessen these costs, thereby augmenting the chances for interstate 
bloodshed. As Senese (1997) argued, “States are less constrained for participation (in 
warfare) when the venue of combat is geographically proximate.” 
In order to determine the effects of proximity on conflict escalation the Correlates of War 
(COW) contiguity data set has been used. Five divisions of state-to-state contiguity are 
delineated by the COW data: contiguous by land, or separated by 12, 24, 150, or 400 miles or 
less of water (those over 400 miles are not considered contiguous). Geographically 
proximate rivals are classified as those that are contiguous by land or separated by 150 miles 
or less of water.5 Proximate dyads are coded as “1” and all others as “0”.  
Sixth, the impact of alliances on interstate relations will be examined. The inclusion of 
data on alliances is needed and appropriate because of its possible relation to joint conflict. 
Alliance members generally have been shown to engage infrequently in conflict with one 
                                                          
4 While the findings of Mansfield and Snyder (1995) are generally supported, a study by Gleditsch and 
Ward (1997) does challenge them. However, this paper finds the work of Mansfield and Snyder 
(1995) to be more compelling. 
5 This delineation is used by Senese (1997, 11) who defends it by noting, “An earlier study (Bremer 
1992) shows the major effect of proximity on conflict to be captured by a ‘contiguous by land or sea’ 
versus ‘not contiguous’ distinction.” In both these studies (Bremer 1992; Senese 1997) 150 miles was 
shown to be the proper cut-off point in accounting for proximal significance. 




another (Mihalka 1976; Bueno de Mesquita 1981; Weede 1989; Kim 1991; Bremer 1992). In 
order to ascertain whether dyad pairs are alliance members the Correlates of War alliance 
data is used (Small and Singer 1982). Weede (1989) and Bremer (1992) both find that the 
major effect of alliance on conflict can be captured in an allied/not allied dichotomy. 
Therefore, allied dyads are coded as “1” and all others as “0.” 
Seventh, a variable measuring trade relations for each of the dyadic pairs of states has 
been created. Realist thinkers have argued that the relative gains of one trading partner could 
ultimately threaten the survival, or at least the international standing, of the other (Gowa and 
Mansfield 1993; Grieco 1988). Liberals, on the other hand, have suggested that the absolute 
gains accumulated by both trading partners may create security externalities, which would 
both increase trade and decrease conflict (Snidal 1991).  
There is no strong scholarly consensus, however, on the impact of trade on international 
conflict. Several studies of interstate conflict and trade have shown that conflict is negatively 
related to international trade (Gasiorowski and Polachek 1982; Polachek 1980; Pollins 1989). 
Yet Russett (1967) and Barbieri (1996) produce quite different findings. Russett (1967: 198) 
found that trade partners were “twice as likely to fight” than those which were not. Barbieri 
(1996) concludes that trade interdependence increases the probability that dyads will 
experience militarized disputes. These mixed findings suggest any hypothesis with respect to 
the impact of trade on conflict levels between interstate is imperiled. Thus, it is assumed that 
trade will have a significant impact on dyadic conflict, yet in what direction remains 
uncertain. 
The majority of trade data are derived from the International Monetary Fund’s Direction 
of Trade Statistics electronic tape.6 Data were reconfigured from national accounts to dyadic 
trade flows using the importing countries’ reported trade figures. When these figures were 
absent, the exporter’s reports were used. The values that each state reports to import from 
each partner were added to derive the dyadic total. Each state’s total imports and export 
figures were combined to arrive at each nation’s total trade.  
Unlike the case of trade, one key variable affecting the decision to escalate has reached a 
status of general consensus among researchers. A number of studies have shown that an 
actor’s relative military capability is the most vital variable affecting the decision to escalate 
(Garnham 1976a, 1976b; Organski and Kugler 1980; Bueno de Mesquita 1981; Leng and 
Gochman 1982; Gochman and Maoz 1984; Bremer 1992; Geller 1993). Military capabilities 
are important to consider because they determine the level of potential costs which can be 
doled out by either side (Small and Singer 1982). Empirical evidence suggests that states of 
relatively equal military capability are more likely to go to war with each other than states 
with disparate capabilities (Bremer 1992). 
So as a eighth marker, an independent variable measuring military capabilities has been 
created. This capability score was obtained from the Correlates of War (COW) data set 
(Small and Singer 1982). Military capabilities are measured by six indicators: military 
                                                          
6 Data are made available by Katherine Barbieri (1996b). Data were collected for all sovereign states 
within the interstate system, as defined by the Correlates of War (COW) Project, for the period 1870-
1992. Barbieri (1996a, 31) notes concerning the data: “In many instances, the electronic version of the 
IMF data tape reports trade flows as zero or missing, but these trade values are reported in their annual 
publications. Missing data were investigated and supplemented with The International Monetary 
Fund’s International Financial Statistics (1956-1998) and The Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook 
(1956-1998).”  
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expenditures, military personnel, iron/steel production, energy consumption, total population, 
and urban population. These indicators are combined in the COW data set to create an index 
reflecting a state’s percentage of the total capabilities in the world for each year. From this 
index, a variable is created to serve as a reflection of the ratio of military capabilities of the 
two actors per dispute. The stronger state is represented in the numerator and the weaker 
state in the denominator. The ratio will vary from 1.0 (the actors’ capabilities are equal) to 
any positive number less than 1. 
These eight independent variables were regressed against the dependent variable 
measures of level of hostility and severity of hostility in order to ascertain the impact of each 





The two-tailed regression results show (Tables Two and Three) that nuclear dyads 
significantly reduce conflict escalation between states in terms of level of conflict but not in 
terms of fatalities. The Y intercept value of 13.961 is the mean response if all the 
independent variables equal zero. If such was the case the model predicts an outcome of 
nearly 14 on the twenty-two point MID scale.   
Beginning with the two predictor variables of concern to this article, the nuclear 
symmetry variable reduced the level of conflict between states by 1.55 and was significant at 
the .04 level. This indicates that a pairing of symmetrical nuclear dyads leads to a 1.55 
reduction in the level of conflict on the twenty-two point MID scale. In the case of 
asymmetrical nuclear dyads an increase in conflict likelihood was found, though it was not 
significant. 
This divergence in findings between symmetrical and asymmetrical dyads suggests that 
nuclear deterrence is nullified in asymmetrical situations. This is most likely the case 
because symmetrical nuclear relationships promote extraordinary caution between countries, 
with both states preferring to err on the side of caution and de-escalate the conflict rapidly. 
 
Table 2. The Effect of Nuclear Weapons on Conflict Level 
 
Variable  Estimate t-Score Significance 
INTERCEPT  13.961 16.422   .01 
Asymmetrical   .605  1.502   .13 
Nuke Symmetry  -1.555  2.026   .04 
Democracy  -.502  .798   .43 
Maturity  -1.932  3.137   .01 
Proximity   .676  1.876   .06 
Allied  -1.871  2.009   .05 
Trade   .001  1.763   .08 
Capabilities  2.765  2.392   .02 
    
N = 840    
R2 = .06    
 




Table 3. The Effect of Nuclear Weapons on Conflict Fatalities 
 
Variable Estimate t-Score Significance 
INTERCEPT  .295 1.643   .10 
Asymmetrical  .078  .937   .34 
Nuke Symmetry -.024  .156   .88  
Democracy -.077  .590   .56 
Maturity -.182 1.462   .14 
Proximity  .449 5.999   .01 
Allied -.147  .775   .44 
Trade -.001  .762   .45 
Capabilities  .192  .782   .43 
    
N = 789    
R2 = .06    
  
The heightened tension of mutual Armageddon experienced by nuclear pairs does not exist 
(at least for the nuclear state) in an asymmetrical dyad as the non-nuclear state can only 
threaten with conventional forces. This, in turn, may reduce the deterrent value of nuclear 
weapons altogether, as the non-nuclear side may feel that as long as it seeks only limited 
objectives, the nuclear state will not decide to employ its weapons of mass destruction for 
fear of international outrage. 
The 1982 invasion and occupation of the Falkland Islands (referred to as the Malvinas 
Islands by the Argentineans) by Argentina provides a clear example of an asymmetrical 
nuclear dyad which escalated to the pinnacle of interstate warfare.7 A limited aimed strategy 
promoted by Argentina’s desire to recapture what it considered to be lost sovereign territory 
overrode any apprehensions the Argentinean junta in charge of the country might have had 
about a potential nuclear response to their military actions. The Argentinean leaders expected 
the British not to respond militarily to their action, and even if they did, they believed that 
they could only wage a limited war (Lebow 1985). It has been argued that the junta believed 
nuclear weapons would never be used in such a small regional theater because of the wrath 
which would befall Great Britain was it to do so (Lebow 1985).   
An alternate explanation is that asymmetrical nuclear dyads permit bullying by the 
nuclear power. Nuclear capability allows the nuclear powers to react more strongly to 
conflict challenges by non-nuclear states. Thus when the United States decided to capture 
Manuel Noriega it invaded Panama to do so. Such a decision almost certainly would not 
have been made had Panama possessed nuclear weapons. 
Most of the other independent variables were found to have a significant effect on 
conflict between states. The most powerful results were from the “Mature” variable (p = .01) 
which measured regime longevity. This variable indicates that the likelihood of conflict is 
decreased in dyads whose two states have had long and stable regimes. This was expected, as 
previous studies have shown that mature regimes tend to behave more prudently in conflict 
                                                          
7 Other research has noted the 1973 Arab Israeli war as an instance of asymmetrical escalation, though 
it clearly was not dyadic in nature. Despite Israel’s “undeclared” status, it was generally understood 
that it had begun production of nuclear arms at its Dimona factory in the Negev desert in 1968. Thus, 
by 1973 it was assumed that Israel possessed twenty to twenty-five nuclear weapons (Paul 1994). 
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situations (Bremer 1992; Senese 1997). 
Surprisingly, however, the presence of democratic institutions in dyads was not shown to 
produce significant effects (p = .425) on conflict escalation, though the sign is in the 
expected direction. While this finding is antithetical to Democratic peace research, it is 
important to recall that the dependent variable in this study is different. Democratic peace 
researchers are focused upon the presence of interstate war as a dependent variable, while 
this paper has expanded this to include any sort of conflict between states. This paper’s 
findings are similar to those of Paul Senese (1997) who found that democratic dyads, while 
unlikely to escalate all the way to war, were just as likely as other types of dyads to escalate 
to threat and displays of force. Senese (1997, 1) finds: “Once a democratic pair has entered a 
militarized dispute, it is about as likely (possibly a little more so) to escalate that dispute 
through further stages of antagonism short of war, as is a non-jointly democratic dyad.” 
Geographic proximity was shown to have significant effects (p = .06) on dyadic 
escalation. This reconfirms the earlier research mentioned previously which asserted that 
states bordering one another are more likely to escalate conflicts than those that do not. Thus, 
neighbors in conflict are more likely to escalate than distal dyadic combinations. 
This clearly has important significance for current conflictual regional dyads. Since 
proximity appears to promote conflict escalation, might nuclear weapons be effectual in 
offsetting discord between neighbors, especially when other pacifying influences such as 
alliance and regime maturity are not present? This question will be addressed in the next 
chapter by qualitatively examining the Indo-Pakistani dyad. 
Alliance membership was shown to significantly (p = .05) reduce the likelihood of 
conflict escalation between dyads. Again, this was to be expected, as the institutional 
constraints placed on alliance members were believed to reduce the likelihood of conflict 
escalation between them. 
Military capabilities were shown to have a significant (p = .02) impact on conflict 
escalation as well. As the military capabilities of two states approach relative equality, the 
likelihood of escalation increases. This finding confirms earlier research, suggesting that 
evenly matched rivals are more likely to escalate than dyads containing two militarily 
divergent states. This is most likely the case in conventional instances because neither side is 
deterred. Relative conventional military equality precludes either party from clearly 
appreciating ahead of time which side would prevail. Thus, the conflict escalates. The 
symmetrical effects of nuclear dyads produce pacifying results, though, because in such 
instances escalation of the conflict would lead to both sides losing. This is the reason why 
deterrence is successful in symmetrical nuclear dyads and not in symmetrical conventional 
dyads. 
Trade was shown to have a very minimal impact in terms of its marginal significance (p 
= .08), as well as its magnitude of effect, on conflict escalation. As the level of trade between 
two states increased, so too did the likelihood of conflict escalation. These results are 
somewhat counter-intuitive, but, again, some earlier research has produced similar findings. 
Employment of the second dependent variable (conflict fatalities) largely did not produce 
significant results. In fact, the only variable displaying a significant effect on fatality levels 
was geographic proximity (p = .01). This suggests that geographically proximal states tend to 
produce higher numbers of fatalities during dyadic conflicts with one another than other 
types of state couplings. This makes sense as proximity provides more and easier 
opportunities for contact with one’s adversary.  
Despite the fact that the remaining variables were not significant, their b values all were 




in the same direction as was in the case when conflict level was the dependent variable, with 
the exception of trade. This movement from a positive to a negative b-value of the trade 
variable indicates that while trade may lead to marginally higher levels of conflict escalation 
between interstate dyads, the fatality levels between trading partners are reduced (though 
insignificantly). What this may indicate is that trading partners are inclined to escalate 
conflicts between one another, but rarely carry such escalation to a point of interstate war, 
where fatality levels would be higher. Recall also that previous research has produced mixed 
results with respect to trade and conflict. Irrespective, it seems reasonable, based on the b-
vales and significance levels, to assert that trade has a very minimal effect on conflict 





In total, these results suggest some positive effects for the presence of nuclear weapons in 
conflict dyads, but only when nuclear weapons appear on both sides. Nuclear symmetry must 
exist for any pacifying effects to occur. In such symmetrical nuclear dyads conflict levels are 
significantly reduced, though fatalities are not. Notably, however, asymmetrical dyads 
appear to be less stable. Indeed the regression results show that conflict and fatalities are 
increased in asymmetrical nuclear dyads, though these results are not significant. 
So nuclear weapons can be a successful deterrent to conflict escalation when they occur 
in symmetrical interstate relationships. Thus, nuclear weapons appear to have played a 
significant role in placating relations between the great powers during the Cold War. Clearly, 
the presence of nuclear weapons on both sides of a dyad does not prevent conflict, but they 
do appear to limit it. Thus the spread of nuclear weapons throughout the international system 
may indeed produce some of the pacifying effects theorized. What is important is where 
these weapons spread. Introduction of nuclear weapons to only one side of an unstable 
regional rivalry (thereby creating a nuclear asymmetry) could produce disastrous results. Yet 
it appears that should both sides of a dyadic rivalry possess nuclear weapons, the level of 
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